Abstract

The cognitive experience view of thought (CEV) holds that thinking is an experience that has phenomenal character, and the content of thought is determined by its cognitive phenomenology. However, Adam Pautz (2013) argues that CEV implies the possibility of mix-and-match cases, as posited in the recombination argument. This argument suggests that a single cognitive-phenomenal property could potentially be combined with various sensory-phenomenal and functional properties. Consequently, Pautz asserts that specific mix-and-match instances are impossible, ultimately undermining the viability of CEV. This paper argues against Pautz’s argument by pointing out that his argument rests on a false premise and the correct inference is that mix-and-match cases are metaphysically possible. Firstly, this paper follows Lennon’s (2022) reconstruction of Pautz’s recombination argument, showing that it is the distinctness of these three kinds of mental properties that allows them to be separated and coexist with each other, thus defending recombination. Secondly, I focus on some special cases of colour experience to further defend the modal independence of cognitive phenomenology. Thirdly, this paper pushes forward the debate of cognitive experience: even in cases of colour that might seem modally dependent on sensory-phenomenal properties, the possibility of mix-and-match cases can be defended. It reveals that mental representations can be exchanged to cope with more challenging circumstances. As a result, it is plausible to conclude that the mind’s capacity is not limited by rationalization and that there are additional alternatives for representing and understanding mental content.