Motivational Judgement Internalism and The Problem of Supererogation

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Abstract
Motivational judgement internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. There is, though, an important lack of clarity in the literature about the types of moral evaluation the theory is supposed to cover. It is rarely made clear whether the theory is intended to cover all moral judgements or whether the claim covers only a subset of such judgements. In this paper I will investigate which moral judgements internalists should hold their theory to apply to. I will argue that the possibility of the supererogation amoralist, someone who makes genuine supererogation judgements but remains unmotivated by them, makes it implausible to be an internalist about moral goodness. As a result, internalists should restrict their claim to moral requirement judgements. I will then argue that this creates an explanatory burden for Internalism. In order for their view to be plausible they must explain why some moral judgements and not others are necessarily connected to motivation.
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Archival date: 2015-11-09
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
The Sources of Normativity.Korsgaard, Christine M.
Moral Realism: A Defense.Shafer-Landau, Russ

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2015-11-09

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