From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth‐Theoretic Fictionalism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):93-118 (2014)
Abstract
We argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philosophers of mathematics ought to endorse a fictionalist view of number-talk, then there is a compelling reason for deflationists about truth to endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk. More specifically, our claim will be that, for deflationists about truth, Yablo’s argument for mathematical fictionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-theoretic fictionalism.
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0031-8205
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ARMFMF-2
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Archival date: 2013-09-16
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References found in this work BETA
The Varieties of Reference.Evans, Gareth
Saving Truth From Paradox.Field, Hartry
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Mackie, John Leslie
Meaning.Horwich, Paul
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Citations of this work BETA
Buddhist Global Fictionalism?Guerrero, Laura P.
Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Wyatt, Jeremy
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2013-03-07
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2013-03-07
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466 ( #8,947 of 50,100 )
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62 ( #9,081 of 50,100 )
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