From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth‐Theoretic Fictionalism

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We argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philosophers of mathematics ought to endorse a fictionalist view of number-talk, then there is a compelling reason for deflationists about truth to endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk. More specifically, our claim will be that, for deflationists about truth, Yablo’s argument for mathematical fictionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-theoretic fictionalism.
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Meaning.Horwich, Paul

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From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Wyatt, Jeremy & Lynch, Michael

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