Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye [Book Review]

David M. Armstrong

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2:31--4 (1995)

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Consciousness representation intentionality secondary qualities

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Qualia and Materialism in Philosophy of Mind

Theories of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind

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ARMQAI-2

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Archival date: 2011-05-17
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References found in this work BETA

Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications.Weiskrantz, Lawrence

Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy.Dixon, N. F.

What is Consciousness?Armstrong, David M.

The Imagery Debate.Tye, Michael

The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature.Anscombe, G. E. M.

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2009-09-28

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