Sellars and Pretense on "Truth & 'Correspondence'"

Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):33-63 (2012)
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Abstract
In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk that we have developed elsewhere
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Archival date: 2013-09-16
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Putnam’s Paradox.Lewis, David K.
Truth as a Pretense.Woodbridge, James A.

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