Ontology of sentential moods

In Myśli o języku, nauce i wartościach. Seria druga. Profesorowi Jackowi Juliuszowi Jadackiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin. pp. 323-339 (2016)
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Abstract
In this paper ontological implications of the Barcan formula and its converse will be discussed at the conceptual and technical level. The thesis that will be defended is that sentential moods are not ontologically neutral since the rejection of ontological implications of Barcan formula and its converse is a condition of a possibility of the imperative mood. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section a systematization of semantical systems of quantified modal logic is introduced for the purpose of making explicit their ontological presuppositions. In this context Jadacki's ontological difference between being and existence is discussed and analyzed within the framework of hereby proposed system of quantified modal logic. The second section discusses ontological implications of the Barcan formula and its converse within the system accommodating the difference between being and existence. The third section presents a proof of incompatibility of the Barcan formula and its converse with the use of imperatives. In the concluding section, a thesis on logical pragmatics foreclosing the dilemma between necessitism and contingentism is put forward and defended against some objections.
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References found in this work BETA
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Williamson, Timothy
A New Introduction to Modal Logic.Cresswell, M. J. & Hughes, G. E.
A New Introduction to Modal Logic.Crivelli, Paolo; Williamson, Timothy; Hughes, G. E. & Cresswell, M. J.

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