Do we have moral obligations towards future people? Addressing the moral vagueness of future environmental scenarios

Veritas 40:49-65 (2018)
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Abstract
In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with moral issues regarding future people and the environment. When it comes to the future, we have deontological and epistemic limitations. The closer to the present, the higher the certainty and the knowledge we have about facts. Thus, when we intend to find moral clarity regarding a future scenario, we deal with an inverse relation between certainty and time. The main problem is that most ways of dealing with moral issues about future scenarios do not address this relation, and rather focus on things that seem to simplify and clarify the uncertainties of the future. In response to this, I propose a different approach, one that operates neutrally and timelessly dealing with the uncertainties of the future while providing moral groundings that can help to clarify the future’s state of moral vagueness.
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Archival date: 2019-02-25
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