The game of metaphysics: towards a fictionalist (meta)metaphysics of science

Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Metaphysics is traditionally conceived as aiming at the truth — indeed, the most fundamental truths about the most general features of reality. Philosophical naturalists, urging that philosophical claims be grounded on science, have often assumed an eliminativist attitude towards metaphysics, consequently paying little attention to such a definition. In the more recent literature, however, naturalism has instead been taken to entail that the traditional conception of metaphysics can be accepted if and only if one is a scientific realist (and puts the right constraints on acceptable metaphysical claims). Here, we want to suggest that naturalists can, and perhaps should, pick a third option, based on a significant yet acceptable revision of the established understanding of metaphysics. More particularly, we will claim that a fictionalist approach to metaphysics is compatible with both the idea that the discipline inquires into the fundamental features of reality and naturalistic methodology; at the same time, it meshes well with both scientific realism and instrumentalism.

Author Profiles

Raoni Arroyo
University of Campinas
Matteo Morganti
Università degli Studi Roma Tre

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