Color Eliminativism and Intuitions About Colors

Rivista di Estetica 43:29-45 (2010)
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Abstract
The philosophical debate over the nature of color has been governed by what we have learnt from color vision science and what color phenomenology suggests to us. It is usually thought that color eliminativism, which maintains that physical objects do not have any properties that can be identified with colors, can account for the former but not the latter. After all, what could be more obvious than the external world to be colored? Here I outline one color eliminativistic response to the objections based on phenomenology.
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Colors and Reflectances.Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R.

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