Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):613-627 (2020)
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Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of representation. Furthermore, we argue that these difficulties derive from their exclusive reliance on the notion of information, so we suggest that pure informational accounts should be complemented with functional approaches.

Author Profiles

Miguel Angel Sebastian
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Marc Artiga
Universitat De València


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