The Modal Theory of Function Is Not about Functions

Philosophy of Science 81 (4):580-591 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In a series of papers, Bence Nanay has recently put forward and defended a new theory of function, which he calls the ‘Modal Theory of Function’. In this article, I critically address this theory and argue that it fails to fulfill some key desiderata that a satisfactory theory of function must comply with. As a result, I conclude that, whatever property Nanay’s notion of function refers to, it is not the property having the function that is standardly attributed in science
No keywords specified (fix it)
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-11-02
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
78 ( #51,382 of 2,461,826 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #59,487 of 2,461,826 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.