Groundwork for a New Moral Epistemology

Klesis 27:155-190 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper argues that virtue ethics and prevailing epistemic norms in moral and political philosophy more generally both support a new kind of empirically-informed moral-virtue epistemology, or “experimental ethics” – an epistemology according to which disputed normative premises in moral and political philosophy should be epistemically evaluated on the basis of empirically-observed relationships they bear to morally admirable and morally repugnant psycho-behavioral traits, as defined by cross-cultural, cross-historical, and cross-debate agreement on the moral valence of particular traits and behaviors.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2013-12-11
Latest version: 2 (2021-08-29)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
424 ( #15,571 of 64,112 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #34,577 of 64,112 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.