The Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Two Puzzles Resolved

Erkenntnis 80 (5):1013-1021 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In a recent paper in this journal, Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. In this note, I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of the familiar but conceptually harmless challenge of adjudicating between relevant interests to reach assessments of threats when applying the precautionary principle. The second puzzle can be shown to rely on a subtle but crucial misrepresentation of the relevant probabilities at play when applying the precautionary principle
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-10-25
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle.Carter, J. Adam & Peterson, Martin
Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question.Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
567 ( #3,692 of 38,017 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #8,048 of 38,017 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.