Darwin's causal pluralism
Biology and Philosophy 11 (1):1-20 (1996)
Abstract
Traditionally, Darwin has been grouped with the functionalists because natural selection (an adaptational mechanism) plays the prominent role in shaping organic form. In this paper, I sketch the dichotomy of functionalism versus structuralism and then argue that Darwin cannot be characterized adequately with this dichotomy. I argue that Darwin can incorporate both causal stories because he makes two important modifications to the traditional metaphysical presuppositions. I then offer some brief reflections on the import of Darwin's causal pluralism for the Philosophy of Science.
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2009-01-28
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97 ( #50,826 of 69,147 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #46,794 of 69,147 )
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