Intellectual Hope as Convenient Friction

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (4):444 (2015)
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Abstract

Pragmatist approaches to truth have often been judged in light of a caricature of William James’ claim that, “the ‘true’ is only the expedient in our way of thinking”. This unfortunate caricature, where truth is claimed to be ‘whatever it’s useful to believe’, means pragmatist theories of truth are generally seen as non-starters, or unworthy of serious attention. And even leaving aside stalking-horse versions of classical pragmatism, there is also a view that whatever contemporary pragmatists have been doing with ‘truth’ it bears little resemblance to the projects that concern analytic philosophers. For example, Rorty’s frequent exhortations for pragmatists to turn their back on truth and look...

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Albert Atkin
Macquarie University

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