"Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology"

American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1--27 (1997)
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This article traces a growing interest among epistemologists in the intellectuals of epistemic virtues. These are cognitive dispositions exercised in the formation of beliefs. Attempts to give intellectual virtues a central normative and/or explanatory role in epistemology occur together with renewed interest in the ethics/epistemology analogy, and in the role of intellectual virtue in Aristotle's epistemology. The central distinction drawn here is between two opposed forms of virtue epistemology, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. The article develops the shared and distinctive claims made by contemporary proponents of each form, in their respective treatments of knowledge and justification.
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Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Kallestrup, Jesper & Pritchard, Duncan
Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.Carter, J. Adam & Pritchard, Duncan
Open-Mindedness.Riggs, Wayne

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