Are Phenomenal Zombies Really Conceivable?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue that if we have a rich enough description of perceptual experiences from an information-theoretic viewpoint, it becomes surprisingly difficult (to put it mildly) to positively conceive philosophical zombies (as complete physical/functional duplicates that lack phenomenal consciousness). Hence, it is at best an open question whether zombies are positively conceivable. My argument requires paying close attention to the direct relation between phenomenology and information.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
AYDAPZ
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-12-15
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
371 ( #18,135 of 64,187 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #28,505 of 64,187 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.