Pain: Perception or Introspection?

In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge (2017)
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Abstract
[Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.
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