Abstract
Affirming that divine knowledge of occurrent changes among particulars
is incompatible with the doctrine of divine immutability, this article seeks to resolve
this tension by denying the latter. Reviewing this long-running debate, I first
formalize the exchange between al-Ghazālı̄and Avicenna on this topic, and then set
out the ways in which contemporary Sadrāean philosophers have tried to resolve
the incompatibility. I argue that none of the cited Sadrāean attempts to resolve the
incompatibility between divine omniscience and immutability is successful. Then,
by reference to certain principles drawn from Shia theology, I indicate how one
might seek to reject the dogma of divine immutability. I conclude that by
emancipating ourselves from that dogma, new horizons could be opened for
Islamic philosophy, free from traditional Hellenistic constraints.