‘Relational Values’ is Neither a Necessary nor Justified Ethical Concept

Ethics, Policy and Environment 1 (1) (2024)
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‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have to environmental areas and places.

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Patrik Baard
University of Oslo


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