A Theory of Necessities

Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (1):151-199 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We develop a theory of necessity operators within a version of higher-order logic that is neutral about how fine-grained reality is. The theory is axiomatized in terms of the primitive of *being a necessity*, and we show how the central notions in the philosophy of modality can be recovered from it. Various questions are formulated and settled within the framework, including questions about the ordering of necessities under strength, the existence of broadest necessities satisfying various logical conditions, and questions about their logical behaviour. We also wield the framework to probe the conditions under which a logicist account of necessities is possible, in which the theory is completely reducible to logic.

Author Profiles

Andrew Bacon
University of Southern California
Jin Zeng
University of Southern California

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-03-16

Downloads
705 (#21,973)

6 months
167 (#19,000)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?