If You’re a Rawlsian, How Come You’re So Close to Utilitarianism and Intuitionism? A Critique of Daniels’s Accountability for Reasonableness

Health Care Analysis 26 (1):1-16 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Norman Daniels’s theory of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ is an influential conception of fairness in healthcare resource allocation. Although it is widely thought that this theory provides a consistent extension of John Rawls’s general conception of justice, this paper shows that accountability for reasonableness has important points of contact with both utilitarianism and intuitionism, the main targets of Rawls’s argument. My aim is to demonstrate that its overlap with utilitarianism and intuitionism leaves accountability for reasonableness open to damaging critiques. The important role that utilitarian-like cost-effectiveness calculations are allowed to play in resource allocation processes disregards the separateness of persons and is seriously unfair towards individuals whose interests are sacrificed for the sake of groups. Furthermore, the function played by intuitions in settling frequent value conflicts opens the door for sheer custom and vested interests to steer decision-making.

Author's Profile

Gabriele Badano
University of York

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-03-23

Downloads
195 (#63,693)

6 months
93 (#37,644)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?