Person-affecting utilitarianism

In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns, The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 251-270 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper argues that impersonal versions of utilitarianism involve an objectionable axiology that does not take personal good seriously. Rather than attributing ethical significance to personal good, they only consider it to be ethically relevant. As a result, they end up sub-ordinating and sacrificing personal good for the sake of impersonal good and thereby treat persons as mere containers of impersonal good. This gives rise to particularly troubling implications in variable-population cases. The paper then evaluates the prospects for person-affecting versions of utilitarianism. It argues that same-number person-affecting utilitarianism is the only version of utilitarianism that neither involves an objectionable axiology nor requires problematic metaphysical commitments.

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Ralf M. Bader
Université de Fribourg

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