The Role of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (1):53-73 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper assesses the role of the Refutation of Idealism within the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as its relation to the treatment of idealism in the First Edition and to transcendental idealism more generally. It is argued that the Refutation is consistent with the Fourth Paralogism and that it can be considered as an extension of the Transcendental Deduction. While the Deduction, considered on its own, constitutes a 'regressive argument', the Refutation allows us to turn the Transcendental Analytic into a 'progressive argument' that proceeds by the synthetic method.

Author's Profile

Ralf M. Bader
Université de Fribourg


Added to PP

1,174 (#8,659)

6 months
117 (#25,490)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?