Legal Norms as Linguistic conventions

In Annual of Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Faculty of Philosophy, Postgraduate Students Book, Volume 4. Sofia University Press. pp. 15-30 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Law is the main regulator of public relations, and the question of the proper use and understanding of legal language is essential for law enforcement. This topic is of interest to both lawyers and philosophers, who often join efforts to study it. This article attempts precisely to take such an interdisciplinary approach when examining legal rules as specific linguistic conventions. First of all, for the sake of a better and more thorough understanding of legal language, legal norms are viewed both from the point of view of semantics and from the point of view of pragmatics. Therefore, for this purpose, a distinction is made between legal norms and legal provisions as their linguistic equivalent. Legal norms are then explored through Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, which describes their semantic content. The pragmatic aspect of the question is explained through John Austin's theory, thus treating legal rules as a kind of specific speech act of a conventional nature.

Author's Profile

Боян Баханов
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski (Alumnus)

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-26

Downloads
76 (#61,170)

6 months
21 (#45,455)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?