Color, externalism, and switch cases

Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362 (2007)
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Abstract
I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject’s wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving externalism available to the color objectivist
ISBN(s)
0038-4283
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BAICEA
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Archival date: 2017-10-28
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