The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605 (2014)
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Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall argue that expressivism does not have the resources to adequately account for ethical vagueness, while cognitivism does. This demonstrates an advantage that cognitivism holds over expressivism
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Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
The Things We Mean.Schiffer, Stephen

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