What makes pains unpleasant?

Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of possessing content that is indeed indicative, but also, crucially, evaluative
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-10-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Sources of Normativity.Korsgaard, Christine M.
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Aydede, Murat & Fulkerson, Matthew
Pains as Reasons.Martínez, Manolo

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total downloads
328 ( #7,120 of 35,943 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
78 ( #3,956 of 35,943 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.