An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):429-448 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Some philosophers writing on the possibility of faultless disagreement have argued that the only way to account for the intuition that there could be disagreements which are faultless in every sense is to accept a relativistic semantics. In this article we demonstrate that this view is mistaken by constructing an absolutist semantics for a particular domain – aesthetic discourse – which allows for the possibility of genuinely faultless disagreements. We argue that this position is an improvement over previous absolutist responses to the relativist's challenge and that it presents an independently plausible account of the semantics of aesthetic discourse.
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-07-30
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
339 ( #19,092 of 2,448,708 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #27,166 of 2,448,708 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.