An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics

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Some philosophers writing on the possibility of faultless disagreement have argued that the only way to account for the intuition that there could be disagreements which are faultless in every sense is to accept a relativistic semantics. In this article we demonstrate that this view is mistaken by constructing an absolutist semantics for a particular domain – aesthetic discourse – which allows for the possibility of genuinely faultless disagreements. We argue that this position is an improvement over previous absolutist responses to the relativist's challenge and that it presents an independently plausible account of the semantics of aesthetic discourse.
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Relativism and Monadic Truth.Cappelen, Herman & Hawthorne, John
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Cappelen, Herman & Hawthorne, John

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Fitting Attitude Theory and the Normativity of Jokes.Patridge, Stephanie & Jordan, Andrew

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