How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency

Ethics 125 (2):391-424 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing an expressivist account of moral discourse. We close by showing how to adapt ordinary formality-based accounts of logicality to define a B-type account of logical inconsistency and distinguish it from both semantic and pragmatic inconsistency. In sum, we provide a roadmap of how to develop a successful B-type expressivism.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-04-19
Latest version: 3 (2014-05-05)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Impassioned Belief.Ridge, Michael

View all 56 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem.Incurvati, Luca & Schlöder, Julian J.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
498 ( #8,201 of 50,269 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #9,658 of 50,269 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.