Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities

Metaphysica 15 (1):209–217 (2014)
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Abstract
It is a commonsense thesis that unactualized possibilities are not parts of actuality. To keep his modal realism in line with this thesis, David Lewis employed his indexical account of the term “actual.” I argue that the addition of counterpart theory to Lewis’s modal realism undermines his strategy for respecting the commonsense thesis. The case made here also reveals a problem for Lewis’s attempt to avoid haecceitism.
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2014-11-03

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