Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities
Metaphysica 15 (1):209–217 (2014)
Abstract
It is a commonsense thesis that unactualized possibilities are not parts
of actuality. To keep his modal realism in line with this thesis, David Lewis
employed his indexical account of the term “actual.” I argue that the addition of
counterpart theory to Lewis’s modal realism undermines his strategy for respecting
the commonsense thesis. The case made here also reveals a problem for
Lewis’s attempt to avoid haecceitism.
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Archival date: 2016-05-19
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2014-11-03
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2014-11-03
Total downloads
316 ( #7,905 of 37,120 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #9,584 of 37,120 )
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