Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.</article-title>< cont [Book Review]

Philosophical Review 108 (4):562-565 (1999)
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Hornsby is a defender of a position in the philosophy of mind she calls “naïve naturalism”. She argues that current discussions of the mind-body problem have been informed by an overly scientistic view of nature and a futile attempt by scientific naturalists to see mental processes as part of the physical universe. In her view, if naïve naturalism were adopted, the mind-body problem would disappear. I argue that her brand of anti-physicalist naturalism runs into difficulties with the problem of mental causation and the completeness of physics.
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