There are no phenomenal concepts

Mind 118 (472):935-962 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an explanation of Mary’s predicament in the situation exploited by Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. I reject the orthodox view; I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. My arguments exploit the sort of considerations that are typically used to motivate externalism about mental content. Although physicalists often appeal to phenomenal concepts to defend their view against the knowledge argument, I argue that this is a mistake. The knowledge argument depends on phenomenal concepts; if there are no phenomenal concepts, then the knowledge argument fails
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BALTAN-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-07-10
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-02-08

Total views
1,130 ( #3,962 of 2,448,955 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #11,772 of 2,448,955 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.