Two-dimensionalism and the social character of meaning

Erkenntnis 79 (S3):567-595 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper develops and critiques the two-dimensionalist account of mental content developed by David Chalmers. I first explain Chalmers's account and show that it resists some popular criticisms. I then argue that the main interest of two-dimensionalism lies in its accounts of cognitive significance and of the connection between conceivability and possibility. These accounts hinge on the claim that some thoughts have a primary intension that is necessarily true. In this respect, they are Carnapian, and subject to broadly Quinean attack. The remainder of the paper advances such an attack. I argue that there are possible thinkers who are willing to revise their beliefs in response to expert testimony, and that such thinkers will have no thoughts with necessary primary intensions. I even suggest that many actual humans may well be such thinkers. I go on to argue that these possible thinkers show that the two-dimensionalist accounts fail.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
2014
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BALTAT-9
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-03-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-10-30

Total views
157 ( #19,246 of 41,618 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #17,435 of 41,618 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.