Metaphysics for Positivists: Mach Versus the Vienna Circle

Discipline Filosophiche 23 (1):57-77 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article distinguishes between Machian empiricism and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers. Mach's natural philosophy was a first order attempt to reform and reorganize physics, not a second order reconstruction of the "language" of physics. Mach's elements were not sense data but realistic events in the natural world and in minds, and Mach admitted unobserved elements as part of his world view. Mach's critique of metaphysics was far more subtle and concerned the elimination of sensory visual imagery from natural science, leaving only concrete elements and functions, very much an inspiration to the young Einstein and Heisenberg and a useful engine of theory construction in physics.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BANMFP
Revision history
First archival date: 2013-03-29
Latest version: 9 (2014-02-15)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Reconsidering Logical Positivism.Friedman, Michael & Richardson, Alan W.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-03-29

Total views
649 ( #5,554 of 49,110 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #10,852 of 49,110 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.