Tu Quoque: The Strong AI Challenge to Selfhood, Intentionality and Meaning and Some Artistic Responses

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This paper offers a "tu quoque" defense of strong AI, based on the argument that phenomena of self-consciousness and intentionality are nothing but the "negative space" drawn around the concrete phenomena of brain states and causally connected utterances and objects. Any machine that was capable of concretely implementing the positive phenomena would automatically inherit the negative space around these that we call self-consciousness and intention. Because this paper was written for a literary audience, some examples from Greek tragedy, noir fiction, science fiction and Dada are deployed to illustrate the view.
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First archival date: 2017-06-29
Latest version: 14 (2017-07-13)
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