An Argument Against Spanking
Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (1):65-78 (2010)
Abstract
I sketch a non-rights-based grounding for the impermissibility of spanking. Even if children have no right against being spanked, I contend that spanking can be seen to be impermissible without appeal to such a right. My approach is primarily consequentialist but also has affinities with virtue ethics, for it emphasizes the moral importance of avoiding bad habits in one’s behavior toward one’s children.
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Archival date: 2015-08-26
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2015-02-04
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890 ( #4,368 of 55,966 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
77 ( #8,641 of 55,966 )
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