An Argument Against Spanking

Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (1):65-78 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I sketch a non-rights-based grounding for the impermissibility of spanking. Even if children have no right against being spanked, I contend that spanking can be seen to be impermissible without appeal to such a right. My approach is primarily consequentialist but also has affinities with virtue ethics, for it emphasizes the moral importance of avoiding bad habits in one’s behavior toward one’s children.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-08-26
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
758 ( #4,089 of 47,160 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
92 ( #6,628 of 47,160 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.