Are Introspective Beliefs about One’s Own Visual Experiences Immediate?

Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1) (2018)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show that introspective beliefs about one’s own current visual experiences are not immediate in the sense that what justifies them does not include other beliefs that the subject in question might possess. The argument will take the following course. First, the author explains the notions of immediacy and truth-sufficiency as they are used here. Second, the author suggests a test to determine whether a given belief lacks immediacy. Third, the author applies this test to a standard case of formation of an introspective belief about one’s own current visual experiences and concludes that the belief in question is neither immediate nor truth-sufficient. Fourth, the author rebuts several objections that might be raised against the argument.

Author's Profile

Wolfgang Barz
Goethe University Frankfurt

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