a logical definition of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction


After the publication of Marshall’s theorem (2009), it has been widely accepted that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot be analyzed in broadly logical terms, but instead requires appealing to more robust metaphysical notions like grounding, naturalness or duplication. However, this is not so. Instead of showing the limitations of Marshall’s still impressive result, I will present here a broadly logical definition of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, and show that it is extensional adequate regardless of our preferred conception of property identity.

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Axel Barceló
Institute Of Philosophy, Mexico


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