Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement

Synthese 193 (9):1-13 (2016)
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Conciliationism faces a challenge that has not been satisfactorily addressed. There are clear cases of epistemically significant merely possible disagreement, but there are also clear cases where merely possible disagreement is epistemically irrelevant. Conciliationists have not yet accounted for this asymmetry. In this paper, we propose that the asymmetry can be explained by positing a selection constraint on all cases of peer disagreement—whether actual or merely possible. If a peer’s opinion was not selected in accordance with the proposed constraint, then it lacks epistemic significance. This allows us to distinguish the epistemically significant cases of merely possible disagreement from the insignificant ones.
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Disagreement.Matheson, Jonathan & Frances, Bryan
Interworld Disagreement.Moruzzi, Sebastiano & Volpe, Giorgio

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