Debunking Arguments and Metaphysical Laws

Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1829-1855 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that one’s views about which “metaphysical laws” obtain—including laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible to what, and about what grounds what—can be used to deflect or neutralize the threat posed by a debunking explanation. I use a well-known debunking argument in the metaphysics of material objects as a case study. Then, after defending the proposed strategy from the charge of question-begging, I close by showing how the proposed strategy can be used by certain moral realists to resist the evolutionary debunking arguments.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-06-02
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
814 ( #8,020 of 71,283 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
73 ( #10,289 of 71,283 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.