Explanatory Information in Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):590-603 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper I defend an intermediate position between the ‘bare mathematical results’ view and the ‘transmission’ view of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (MEPPs). I argue that, in MEPPs, it is not enough to deduce the explanandum from the generalizations cited in the explanans. Rather, we must add information regarding why those generalizations obtain. However, I also argue that it is not necessary to provide explanatory proofs of the mathematical theorems that represent those generalizations. I illustrate this with the bridges of Königsberg case.

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Manuel Barrantes
California State University, Sacramento

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