Gender and Gender Terms1

Noûs 54 (3):704-730 (2020)
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Abstract
Philosophical theories of gender are typically understood as theories of what it is to be a woman, a man, a nonbinary person, and so on. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. There’s good reason to suppose that our best philosophical theory of gender might not directly match up to or give the extensions of ordinary gender categories like ‘woman’.
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Archival date: 2019-06-04
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