Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to a dilemma: it either yields an interpretation under which the thesis is philosophically interesting but false, or it produces an interpretation under which the thesis is actually true but of minor philosophical interest.
ISBN(s)
1053-8364
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BARITA-13
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-07-14
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-07-14

Total views
221 ( #13,562 of 39,920 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
116 ( #3,371 of 39,920 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.