Loopy regulations: The motivational profile of affective phenomenology

Philosophical Topics 47 (2):233-261 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Affective experiences such as pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenology: they feel pleasant. This type of phenomenology has a loopy regulatory profile: it often motivates us to act a certain way, and these actions typically end up regulating our affective experiences back. For example, the pleasure you get by tasting your morning coffee motivates you to drink more of it, and this in turn results in you obtaining another pleasant gustatory experience. In this article, we argue that reflexive imperativism is the only intentionalist account of affective phenomenology—probably, the only account at all—that is able to make sense of its loopy regulatory profile.

Author Profiles

Luca Barlassina
University of Sheffield
Max Khan Hayward
University of Sheffield


Added to PP

471 (#24,185)

6 months
101 (#14,203)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?