More of me! Less of me! Reflexive imperativism about affective phenomenal character

Mind (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (2): (1) More of P! (2) Less of U! If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me!, Get less of me!
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BARMOM-7
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Archival date: 2019-04-11
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2019-04-11

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