Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):1-26 (2016)
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In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.
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Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1.MacAskill, William & Ord, Toby
Moral Uncertainty.Bykvist, Krister

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