Resemblance As Repleteness: A Solution To Goodman’s Problem

Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 3 (2):59-65 (2006)
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In this paper I consider the view that Goodman altogether rejects the notion of resemblance in depiction. I argue that, although Goodman’s case seems to be a decisive challenge, he can in fact hold a positive view of resemblance if we weaken the standard usage of the word ‘resemblance’. The result of this is that Goodman’s commitment to the notion of repleteness enables him to say that pictures can and do resemble their subjects, as resemblance relies on the relative complexity of the depiction.


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