Scepticism about Beneficiary Pays: A Critique

Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (4):285-300 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Some moral theorists argue that being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims, at least when it is impossible to extract compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. This idea has been applied to climate change in the form of the beneficiary-pays principle. Other philosophers, however, are quite sceptical about beneficiary pays. Our aim in this article is to examine their critiques. We conclude that, while they have made important points, the principle remains worthy of further development and exploration. Our purpose in engaging with these critiques is constructive — we aim to formulate beneficiary pays in ways that would give it a plausible role in allocating the cost of addressing human-induced climate change, while acknowledging that some understandings of the principle would make it unsuitable for this purpose
Reprint years
2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BARSAB-4
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-09-12
Latest version: 3 (2015-09-12)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-09-13

Total views
635 ( #4,861 of 45,271 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
151 ( #3,103 of 45,271 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.