Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):281-301 (2019)
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Abstract

Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is unsustainable: some kind of anti-realism must be adopted. We go on to provide an argument against eliminativism about temporal thought. While it doesn't follow from this argument that fictionalism about temporal thought is true, we suggest that this nonetheless shows that fictionalism should be regarded as the preferred view.

Author Profiles

Sam Baron
University of Melbourne
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

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